

## CHAPTER 2

# Being Buckingham: Hamilton's German Adventure, 1628–1632

Hamilton, a young nobleman in his early twenties, chose a European stage for his first substantial public act. It was something that confirmed his political opinions, revealed his religious sympathies and forged his self-image. For the rest of his career, he was to some degree defined by his recruitment and command of a voluntary force to fight alongside the Lutheran king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus (1594–1632), in order to regain the Palatine for his cousin, Elizabeth. Hamilton's commitment to the restoration of the lost German territories to Charles's sister, Elizabeth, and brother-in-law, Frederick, established his reputation as a patron of the Protestant cause in Europe. There was no greater emotive issue in Scotland and England at the time, and for many the cause of Elizabeth and Frederick was indistinguishable from resisting Habsburg-Catholic hegemony in mainland Europe. This first public act also established Hamilton, for good or ill, as a soldier, who had been blooded in the most brutal war of the century, and who was thereafter associated with military matters, whether it was recruitment of soldiers for service abroad, or indeed for him to be a commander of forces in the wars of the three kingdoms in 1639–40 and in 1648. The military aspect of his life was fixed fast at the beginning of his career, and it followed him to the scaffold.

Another important issue is the extent to which Hamilton enjoyed the king's support, most clearly seen in the plot allegations of 1631, linking his name to the Scottish crown. Yet whilst he could rely on unwavering loyalty from the thirty-one year old monarch, he did not wield sufficient political influence for Charles to back a full-scale war against the Habsburgs. The duke of Buckingham had possessed that power, Hamilton did not and never would. The headstrong young adventurer of twenty-four, was nevertheless eager to emulate, and surpass, the military exploits of Buckingham, the previous master of the horse. For all that, however, he was a naive pawn who was manipulated by both Gustavus and Charles to further their own foreign policy objectives: by the former as a prologue to a full-blown Anglo-Swedish alliance and by the latter as a token gesture towards

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a military solution to the ticklish issue of his homeless elder sister.<sup>1</sup> Whether fully supported by Charles or not, Hamilton's expedition influenced the course of Caroline foreign policy and helped to shape the credo of the Personal Rule. His experience on the continent, as discussed with the king, helped steer Charles away from an Anglo-Swedish alliance and public commitment to the European war. But it was almost certainly a case of confirming Charles's opinion rather than altering it. This was an ironic achievement, given the reasons for undertaking the expedition.

## I

Like many of his formative actions, Hamilton's interest in the Palatine cause can be traced to his father. The second marquis corresponded with Frederick, elector Palatine, and was a vocal supporter of the 'Winter King' after he accepted the crown of Bohemia in November 1619.<sup>2</sup> He was allied to the third earl of Pembroke, Archbishop Abbot and the countess of Bedford, who viewed the plight of the king and queen of Bohemia within the broader ideological framework of the Protestant cause.<sup>3</sup> In that sense, Hamilton was the ideological heir of his father.<sup>4</sup> The sad fate of the Palatine family had mass popular appeal in Scotland and England.<sup>5</sup> In fact, in the later 1620s Elizabeth was next in line to the Stuart kingdoms and presented a credible Protestant alternative (and threat) to her brother Charles.

On his return to court in late 1628, Hamilton continued the family connection with his dispossessed cousin, giving it practical expression in his determination to take an expeditionary force to Germany.<sup>6</sup> It remains unclear whether Charles asked Hamilton to levy the force, or if Hamilton offered and the king accepted.<sup>7</sup> Either way, Hamilton was motivated in that direction and predisposed towards the hawks at court, especially Viscount Dorchester and Sir Thomas Roe. There may have been other reasons for the marquis being tempted to go abroad, but the evidence is patchy. Hamilton had not completely reconciled with his wife, despite attempts by members of the queen's circle, the earl of Denbigh and the king to heal the rift.<sup>8</sup> The marital problems may have provided a further nudge to go abroad, though he was on good enough terms with his wife to make her

<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth's grandson by her daughter Sophia of Hanover would succeed to the British Crown as George I in 1714, the first of the House of Hanover.

<sup>2</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9345 (Fr[ederic[k of Bohemia] to James, second marquis of Hamilton, 25 November 1619). See also *HMC., Hamilton Supplementary*, 9 (Elizabeth, queen of Bohemia to countess of Bedford, 3/13 March [1620]; GD 406/1/9344 (Frederick to second marquis of Hamilton, 8/18 May 1621). For Elizabeth, *HMC, Hamilton Supplementary*, 191 (Elizabeth to second marquis of Hamilton, 17/27 May [before March 1625]). See also, chapter 1, section II.

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of this group see S. Adams, 'Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624' in K.M. Sharpe, *Faction and Parliament*. (Oxford, 1978), pp. 139–171, 144.

<sup>4</sup> Burnet, *Memoirs of the Hamiltons* (1852), p.6. For those at court similarly motivated, L.J. Reeve, *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule* (Cambridge, 1989), for Pembroke, pp.38–9, 61; and Dorchester, pp.40, 112, 189, 210, 241, 255, 275–6, 282, 284; and Roe, pp.112, 192, 227.

<sup>5</sup> NRS E.65/6; *Acts of the Parliament of Scotland*, iv, 474–80; Reeve, *Road to Personal Rule*, p.222. See also Adams, 'Foreign Policy', p.147. After 1628, the same attitude appears to have gained support in Europe, G. Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1984), p.81.

<sup>6</sup> The young earl of Arran appears to have had at least one veteran of the European wars, David Ramsay, in his retinue, Hamilton MSS Lennoxlove, TD/90/73/F1/25/7 (Account Book of Arran's expenses, 1620, November–May 1621); Lennoxlove, TD/90/73/F1/50 (Account Book of Hamilton on Arran, 1628). As another early indicator of Hamilton's interest in the exploits of Gustavus see NRS GD 406/1/10832 (Newsletter, [before 1625]); GD 406/1/102 ('Propositions & Resolutions of ye King of Suede sent to ye Emperor, febr 1629'). For the significance of this paper as a first indication of Gustavus's intentions towards Germany, Parker, *Thirty Years' War*, pp.79–81.

<sup>7</sup> Burnet suggested that Hamilton did not propose the venture, Burnet, *Memoirs of the Hamiltons* (1852), p.7. Gardiner suggested that Charles 'gave permission' to Hamilton to 'levy six thousand volunteers', S.R. Gardiner, *History of England, 1603–42*. 12 vols in 10 (London, 1883–4), vii, 174–5, while Reeve commented that Charles 'had allowed the adventurous young Hamilton to levy English and Scottish volunteers', *Road to Personal Rule*, p.266.

<sup>8</sup> See Chapter 1, pp.17–19.

pregnant before he left.<sup>9</sup> He may also have seen his German expedition as a way to avoid the advances of his creditors and in particular the unwelcome attention of the Commission for Surrenders and Teinds. It may be significant that while he was abroad all legal processes against his estate were suspended by a royal warrant, and Charles took personal responsibility for his friend's affairs.<sup>10</sup>

The offer of military aid was carried to the king of Sweden by Hamilton's kinsman Colonel Sir Alexander Hamilton (the first earl of Haddington's brother) sometime in 1629. Then Hamilton's client, David Ramsay (d.1642), a gentleman of the privy chamber, was sent to Sweden to negotiate conditions for the army of 6,000 men, which Hamilton intended to raise.<sup>11</sup> By 30 May 1630, a set of articles had been agreed by Ramsay and Colonel Hamilton with Gustavus Adolphus.<sup>12</sup> The preface to the articles stated that the contract was between the king of Sweden and Hamilton, and no mention was made of Charles I.<sup>13</sup> Hamilton's army would be doubled in size, with reinforcements from Gustavus, if he did not merge with the Swedish army on arrival.<sup>14</sup> If he was to campaign independently he was promised money, arms, ammunition, and an adviser with whom he could 'consult in all things.'<sup>15</sup>

Hamilton was the dependent of Gustavus rather than Charles, especially after he landed on mainland Europe.<sup>16</sup> Even so, the financial responsibility for the expedition was vague, and the two kings were expected to contribute at different stages: Charles for the initial recruitment and launch, and Gustavus for maintenance and reinforcements thereafter. In short, Hamilton's expedition was a characteristic fudge by Charles. He sought to associate himself with a military solution in Germany, while refusing French overtures for a joint effort against the Habsburgs, and at the same time concluding a secret treaty with Spain against the United Provinces.<sup>17</sup> In the midst of this over-complicated foreign policy, Hamilton was left to organise an expedition on a limited budget and to generate support at home and abroad.

Hamilton's effort to secure support in the Netherlands is a case in point. At the end of 1630, David Ramsay was sent to the Hague to negotiate the assistance of the prince of Orange and the estates, and to request a financial contribution from the exiled king and queen of Bohemia.<sup>18</sup> Ramsay failed to get any assistance from Holland because, as he told Hamilton, 'they can not beleve

<sup>9</sup> W.R.O., Feilding of Newnham Paddox MSS, CR 2017/C1/37 (Duchess to Feilding, 4 Feb. 1630/31). Hamilton and his father-in-law the earl of Denbigh (with whom Hamilton had a close relationship) both planned to leave court for extended periods, W.R.O., Feilding of Newnham Paddox MSS, CR 2017/C1/36 (Katherine Manners, duchess of Buckingham to Basil, Lord Feilding, November [?] 1630).

<sup>10</sup> NRS GD 406/1/205 (Charles I to Viscount Dupplin, chancellor and Sir James Skene, president of the College of Justice, 14 June 1631).

<sup>11</sup> Colonel Sandy Hamilton was in Stockholm around May 1630 acting as Hamilton's agent, W. Fraser, *Memorials of the Earls of Haddington*. 2 vols (Edinburgh 1889), i, 27. Ramsay went later, see W. Cobbett, *A Complete Collection of State Trials* 12vols (London, 1809–26), iii, 446–447 (The Relation of Donald Lord Reay).

<sup>12</sup> The articles are printed in Burnet, *Memoirs of the Hamiltons* (1852), pp.8–10. The original can be seen through NRA(S) 2177, bundle 1410, 1–1a.

<sup>13</sup> Burnet, *Memoirs of the Hamiltons* (1852), p.8.

<sup>14</sup> Articles 1–4. Gustavus would provide 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse to enable Hamilton to 'make an impression elsewhere'.

<sup>15</sup> Articles 4–10. Article 5 confirms that all territory taken from the enemy would belong to the Swedish king, but that the revenues would go to Hamilton.

<sup>16</sup> These articles are also printed in Burnet, *Memoirs of the Hamiltons* (1852), p.11–12. The original can be found at, NRS GD 406/M1/23 (1 March 1631, Articles (signed by Hamilton) ratifying the mutual compact with the king of Sweden).

<sup>17</sup> Reeve, *Road to Personal Rule*, pp.253–60; Gardiner, *England*, vii, 175–80.

<sup>18</sup> It was hoped the Estates would contribute 1,000 carts, provisions, some companies of horse and foot or failing that to grant a subsidy, NRS GD 406/1/9296 ([Ramsay] to the States General of Holland with their answer, 5/15 April 1631), noted in HMC., *Hamilton supplementary*, pp.13–16.

that the king of ingland intends any thing reallie for the advancment of your busines.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, the king and queen of Bohemia sent numerous letters of support to the hopeful young marquis, but stressed their inability to make a financial contribution.<sup>20</sup> On the face of it, the king of Sweden warmly supported Hamilton's expedition. Unlike the Netherlands' narrow view, Gustavus saw Hamilton's army as a snare to draw the king of Britain into publicly promoting a large scale military commitment on the continent. By the end of 1630, Gustavus had obtained support for his grand campaign in Germany from France, Russia and Holland and through Hamilton he looked to add Britain to his group of supporters.<sup>21</sup> Gustavus's ideal scenario was that Hamilton's force of 6,000 would embark in the Summer of 1631, with up to 10,000 reinforcements following, after a full public alliance had been concluded between Britain and Sweden.<sup>22</sup> Before Hamilton left for the continent, Sir Henry Vane, the comptroller of the household, was chosen for the mission to discuss the projected alliance with Gustavus and left England in late September 1631.<sup>23</sup>

Meanwhile, on 18 July, the day before Hamilton set sail, additional levies of volunteers to bolster Sweden's forces was permitted.<sup>24</sup> A few months later Secretary Dorchester happily informed Hamilton, 'his Maty in the meantime [is] continuing his affection to ye king of Swede [and] doth give order for more men to follow that way ye lp hath led.'<sup>25</sup> Yet the numbers were not huge, a few hundred at first, and the total probably not more than a thousand.<sup>26</sup> Still, Dorchester and Roe pressed for the alliance when Hamilton left, in the face of stiff opposition from Weston and the other doves.<sup>27</sup> There was much at stake, for the political battle over the projected Anglo-Swedish alliance would decide the character of the Caroline regime in the thirties.<sup>28</sup> One thing was certain, funding for anything more than the modest force Hamilton was recruiting would require a parliament to be called. The final decision was made by Charles, and Hamilton's experiences on the continent influenced the decision to opt for isolation.

## II

Acting as a private individual, Hamilton had to recruit, equip, finance and transport a British expeditionary force to the continent. It took about seventeen months from the signing of the commission on 15 December 1629 to the embarkation from Yarmouth on 19 July 1631.<sup>29</sup> It was common knowledge that Charles supported the mobilisation, yet the lack of official backing constantly

<sup>19</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9308 (David Ramsay to Hamilton, 8 November 1630) printed in *HMC., Hamilton supplementary*, pp.10–11.

<sup>20</sup> For Frederick see NRS GD 406/1/10464, 10465, 10466, 10467 [Hamilton Red Book, i, 48, 49, 50, 51]. For Elizabeth, GD 406/123, 125, 142. On the king and queen's financial position, GD 406/1/147 (Elizabeth to Hamilton, 12/22 June [1630]).

<sup>21</sup> On French, Dutch and Russian support see Parker, *Thirty Years' War*, p.80; Reeve, *Road to Personal Rule*, pp.265–66.

<sup>22</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9257 (Gustavus to Hamilton, 25 April 1631); GD 406/1/9256 (Gustavus to Hamilton, 26 April 1631).

<sup>23</sup> Sir Philip Warwick, *Memoirs of the Reign of King Charles I* (London, 1702), pp. 107–8. It has been suggested that Vane was pro-Spanish and therefore a cautious choice, Gardiner, *History of England*, vii, 188; Reeve, *Road to Personal Rule*, pp. 227, 275–88. However, Vane may have been switching allegiance from Weston to Hamilton at this time, *CSPD, 1631–33*, 332 (Suckling to Vane, 2 May 1632).

<sup>24</sup> Sir Piers Crosby was to recruit 2,000 in Ireland and Sir Thomas Conway was to recruit 700 in England, TNA SP 16/196/91 (earl of Holland to Dorchester, 18 July 1631).

<sup>25</sup> NRS GD 406/1/209 (Dorchester to Hamilton, 2 September 1631).

<sup>26</sup> Hamilton was to receive 300 men to bolster Sir John Hamilton's regiment, as well as a further 800 men to be sent later, NRS GD 406/1/195 (Carlisle to Hamilton, 7 August 1631).

<sup>27</sup> Reeve, *Road to Personal Rule*, p.267.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> *HMC., Hamilton*, 47(96) (Commission, Gustavus to Hamilton 15 December 1629). Hamilton was under sail by 19 July 1631, TNA SP 16/196/95 (Hamilton to Dorchester, 19 July 1631).

hampered progress at home and abroad.<sup>30</sup> Even Charles's financial aid was not straightforward, being two grants from the English Treasury totalling £23,000, supported by a grant to Hamilton on 25 February 1631 of the lease of the customs and imposts of wines in Scotland for sixteen years, estimated at the time to be worth a total of £60,000 stg.<sup>31</sup> The grant of the wine tack had a twofold aim. It was first to stand security for loans to finance the expedition, and second, it was to ease Hamilton's debt and ensure the long term solvency of his estates.<sup>32</sup> The wine customs was about the most stable revenue stream the crown had in Scotland, and William Dick of Braid (1580–1655) was farming it for £6,253 per annum, amounting to a total of £100,053 over the sixteen year lease; £40,000 more than the estimated value.<sup>33</sup> Hamilton agreed to surrender the tack back to the crown after only three years for £40,000.<sup>34</sup> No accurate figure has survived to show how much of the wine tack was mortgaged to pay for the expedition, but it was probably about £20,000.<sup>35</sup> So Hamilton spent about £43,000 on his expedition, which was just about enough to levy, launch and maintain his forces for the first few months. After he sailed for Germany, however, Charles's financial commitment ended and Gustavus was to take over.<sup>36</sup> The procuring of arms and ammunition was also unstable as Gustavus suddenly reneged on the agreement to provide supplies.<sup>37</sup>

The initial plan was to recruit the whole army in Scotland but a poor response necessitated an English muster.<sup>38</sup> The recruitment drive stumbled towards 1,200 in Scotland, while the English muster yielded over 5,000, which was enough to satisfy the contract between Gustavus and Hamilton.<sup>39</sup> It was achieved by Charles badgering lord lieutenants in England to assist, and latterly London was scoured for able vagrants and masterless men.<sup>40</sup> The army was organised into three English regiments and one Scottish. There were 35 English and 18 Scottish officers for a force of 5,000 English and 1,000 Scots.<sup>41</sup> Of the four regimental commanders three were Scottish – two of them being Hamiltons – and one was English. Sir James Ramsay and Sir James Hamilton each commanded an English regiment, and the Englishman Sir Jacob Astley, led the third, with Sir Alexander Hamilton in command of the Scots regiment. The four colonels had close ties with Hamilton or his collaborators. Sir James Hamilton was a kinsman and member of Hamilton's household; Sir Alexander (Sandy) Hamilton was a kinsman and dependent on Hamilton for his

<sup>30</sup> NRS GD 406/1/205 (Charles I to Chancellor and President of the College of Justice, 14 June 1631); Gardiner, *England*, vii, 184.

<sup>31</sup> TNA SO 3/9 (Signet Office Docquet Book) unfol., September 1630; TNA SO 3/9 unfol., May 1631. Dorchester secured both grants. About £2,000 of the £12,000 grant may have been unpaid, TNA E. 403/2415, fol.9v; NRS GD 406/M9/21 (letter of gift under the Great Seal, 15 February 1630) and the signature GD 406/Bundle 508. See also GD 406/M1/22 (15 March 1630/1). For the estimate of the total worth of the wine tack, Innerleithen, Traquair MSS, 5/9 ('Instructions ... anent the marq[uis] of hamilton', June [1633]).

<sup>32</sup> T. Birch, ed., *The Court and Times of Charles I* 2 vols (London, 1848), i, 102–3; *State Trials*, iii, 451 (Trial of James Lord Ochiltree). For more on Hamilton's finances and the wine tack, see chapter 5.

<sup>33</sup> *RPCS, 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, 1633–35*, 305–6. The figure was 112,000 merks Scots.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Innerleithen, Traquair MSS, 5/9.

<sup>36</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9360 ([Draft] Hamilton to Charles, [May 1631?]).

<sup>37</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9320 (Lord Reay to Hamilton, 15 January 1630/31); *HMC, Hamilton*, p. 72 (26) (Instructions to colonel Alexander Leslie, [1631]); NRS GD 406/1/9322 (Leslie to Hamilton, 12 May 1631).

<sup>38</sup> *RPCS, 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, 1630–32*, 58, 193–4, 225–6, 620. For Hamilton in Scotland, NRS GD 406/1/197 (Earl of Carlisle to Hamilton, 3 May 1631). Hamilton made at least two trips to Scotland in March and May. See also Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 122.

<sup>39</sup> Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 127; TNA SP 16/194/32 (Charles I to lord lieutenants of several counties, 19 June 1631); NRS GD 406/1/206 ([Copy][Dorchester ?] to justices of the peace and deputy lieutenants of Northamptonshire, 23 June 1631); *Ibid.*, ([Copy][Dorchester ?] to earl of Westmoreland, 23 June 1631).

<sup>40</sup> TNA SP 16/195/33 (Charles I to Sir Robert Duncie, [before 19] June 1631); SP 16/195/15 (Charles I to Masters and Rulers of the Company of Watermen, 28 June 1631).

<sup>41</sup> *HMC, Hamilton Supplementary*, pp. 180–88.

place of gentleman of the privy chamber, and later for two pensions totalling £800 a year.<sup>42</sup> Sir James Ramsay was linked to Hamilton through the earl of Denbigh, he was the brother of David Ramsay, and he enjoyed Hamilton's patronage throughout the thirties.<sup>43</sup> Sir Jacob Astley, a veteran of the continental wars, owed his place to the recommendation of Sir Henry Vane and Elizabeth of Bohemia, the latter describing him as 'an honest sufficient man and firme in religion.'<sup>44</sup> Astley was made sergeant-major general of the army and played a key role in Hamilton's counsel.<sup>45</sup> During the 1630s, Astley acted as Hamilton's 'intelligencer' in Europe and likewise enjoyed the marquis's continued patronage.<sup>46</sup> A similar affinity endured between Hamilton and another veteran, Sir Alexander Leslie, later first earl of Leven, the commander of the proposed auxiliary troops to be provided by Gustavus.<sup>47</sup> Leslie was in Swedish service until he returned to Scotland in October 1638, during which time he corresponded with Hamilton, informed him of events on the continent and enlisted his support for Swedish levies in Britain.<sup>48</sup> In two of the surviving letters Leslie addressed Hamilton as his 'Patron', suggesting a close bond that survived at least until 1641, when he alerted Hamilton to the assassination plot known as 'the Incident'.<sup>49</sup>

### III

Hamilton did not have to wait until 1641 for his enemies to close in on him and try to have him removed from Charles's side. Exactly a decade earlier, he returned to court from Scotland to be faced with accusations that he intended to use his army to seize the Scottish crown. To most contemporaries the affair was a confusing mish-mash of gossip, half truths and Court tittle-tattle. The Venetian Diplomatic Agent, Giovanni Soranzo, writing on 4 July, alerted his masters of the affair in terms that reflected the problem:

Some days ago two Scottish gentlemen were arrested at Greenwich, where the Court now is, and another person of the same nation was also laid hands on before them. Commissioners, one of whom is the Earl of Carlisle, who is a Scot, have been deputed to draw up the process against them. The incident has excited remark, because the whole affair has been carried out with the most extreme and extraordinary secrecy.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>42</sup> TNA SO3/11, July 1635; W. Knowler, ed., *The Earl of Strafford's Letters and Dispatches* (2 vols. Dublin, 1740), ii, 277 (Captain Stewart to Wentworth, 7 February 1638/9).

<sup>43</sup> Sir James was in Spain during Charles's wooing of the Infanta, and at the Rhe expedition, both times probably under Denbigh's patronage, W.R.O., Feilding of Newnham Paddox, CR 2017/C1/3 (Sir James to Denbigh, 25 March [1623]). For Rhe, *CSPD*, 1628–9, 251, 488.

<sup>44</sup> NRS GD 406/1/183 (Vane to Hamilton, 7 May 1631); GD 406/1/8383 (Astley to Hamilton, 10/20 May 1631); NRS GD 406/1/140 (Elizabeth to Hamilton, 21 June [1631]). Astley had been involved in the European wars since 1599, P. R. Newman, *Royalist Officers in England and Wales, 1642–1660. A Biographical Dictionary* (New York, 1981), number 39, pp.9–10.

<sup>45</sup> Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 102–103.

<sup>46</sup> *HMC Hamilton Supplementary*, 191 (Elizabeth to Hamilton, 16/26 November [n.d]); *Ibid*, 193 (Elizabeth to Hamilton, 18/20 October [1635]); *Ibid*, 191 (Elizabeth to Hamilton, 16/26 November [n.d.]). For Astley as Hamilton's 'intelligencer,' *Ibid*, 43 (Charles, Prince Palatine to Hamilton, 4 September 1637).

<sup>47</sup> Leslie may have had the rank of serjeant-major general. I owe this point to Richard Brzezinski. Leslie was involved on the continent at an early stage in the mobilisation, *HMC, Hamilton*, 72 (25) (Gustavus to Hamilton, 18/28 April 1631); *HMC, Hamilton*, 72 (26) (Gustavus' instructions to colonel Alexander Leslie, 1631). Leslie was to be assisted by Dr. J.G. Salvius. See also, *HMC, Hamilton*, 73 (31) (Salvius to Hamilton, 4/14 July 1631); NRS GD 406/1/9320 (Reay to Hamilton, 15 January 1631); GD 406/1/9257 (Gustavus to Hamilton, 25 April 1631). *HMC Hamilton*, 73(32) (Gustavus to Hamilton, 3 August 1631); C.S. Terry, *The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, first Earl of Leven*, (London, 1899) pp. 21–22.

<sup>48</sup> *HMC, Hamilton*, 81(62) (Leslie to Hamilton, 26 November, 1632); Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 33–34 (Leslie to Hamilton, 16 April, 1636); Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 34–36 (Leslie to Hamilton, 9 May, 1637).

<sup>49</sup> Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 33–36.

<sup>50</sup> *CSPV*, 1629–32, 523. For further mention of the 'mystical business' see Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 126.

Even from this opaque account, the emphasis was on Scotsmen. As more details surfaced it remained that Scots were almost exclusively both accusers and accused. This is important, because it is one way to make sense of the affair. The alleged plot of 1631 was an attempt by adversaries to topple an opponent, using methods familiar in Scottish politics but less prevalent in English politics.<sup>51</sup> The main threads of this complicated affair will be unravelled by presenting four main blocks within a loose narrative framework: first, a brief account of the accusations and how they came to light; second, a detailed look at the main characters; third, how the preliminary examination was conducted; and finally, a short account of the trial in a court of chivalry and its broader implications. One of the main problems is distinguishing who said what, and when. Precedence will therefore be given to rendering the details of what individuals said or what the hearer believed they said.

Two of the three main characters in the affair, David Ramsay and Sir Donald Mackay, 1st Lord Reay (1591–1649), were closely involved in the organisation of Hamilton's expedition: Ramsay in Hamilton's employment and Reay in the king of Sweden's.<sup>52</sup> Taking the evidence from Reay's 'Relation', or deposition, of 18 May 1631, the men met for the first time in Stockholm sometime in May 1630 and, shortly after, had talks on three consecutive evenings; the first two on board Reay's ship at Elsinore, Denmark, and the last on a nearby isle. On each occasion Ramsay complained bitterly of the court's infiltration by papists and Arminians. As a result, he suspected that a change of religion was likely and further maintained that Hamilton intended to oppose such a move. Ramsay blamed Lord Treasurer Weston and the bishops for this slide into popery. These spiritual degenerates were juxtaposed with Hamilton who, claimed Ramsay, sent the lord treasurer a challenge. The 'Relation' also revealed that a toast was drunk to Hamilton as king of Scotland by Colonel Alexander Hamilton, Sir James Hamilton and David Ramsay in the presence of Reay.<sup>53</sup>

It was almost a year before Ramsay and Reay met again, this time in Amsterdam. Ramsay continued his diatribe against the Spanish faction at court, whom he identified as Lord Treasurer Weston, the earl of Carlisle, Viscount Cottington and Kenelm Digby.<sup>54</sup> According to Reay, Ramsay 'hoped' that Hamilton would protect England from the ambitions of France and Spain.<sup>55</sup> Finally, on his arrival in England, Reay was accepted into the expedition by Hamilton and held discussions with Sir James Ramsay, Sir James Hamilton, Captain Archibald Douglas and the earl of Roxburgh.<sup>56</sup> More interestingly, Reay also told of a discourse between Hamilton and his senior officers about making an "insurrection". This stands out in contrast from the rest of Reay's 'Relation' as it clearly implicated Hamilton in the alleged conspiracy, though curiously it was not referred to in the later examination or trials.<sup>57</sup>

Reay's decision to divulge these conversations to James Stewart, Lord Ochiltree (d.1658), transformed the situation. As his first examination showed, Reay first mentioned the plot to Ochiltree on 6 or 7 May, a few days before Hamilton made another of his recruitment trips to Scotland.<sup>58</sup> On 13 May, Reay went to Ochiltree's chamber and recounted the full details of a plot to use Hamilton's levies to overthrow the royal family, execute the Englishmen of the Spanish faction and the principal men of the Scottish government. Both men immediately decided that Ochiltree would inform

<sup>51</sup> Keith M. Brown, *Bloodfeud in Scotland 1573–1625* (Oxford, 1986).

<sup>52</sup> For Ramsay see above. He was in Holland between 8 November 1630 and 8 February 1631 at least, see NRS GD 406/1/9308, 9321. For Mackay see *HMC, Hamilton*, 70 (19) (Reay to Hamilton 15 January, 1630/31); *HMC, Hamilton*, 70 (18) (Gustavus to Hamilton 3 December, 1630); *HMC, Hamilton*, 70 (19) (Gustavus to Hamilton, 15 January, 1630/31). The third main character was Robert Meldrum, see below.

<sup>53</sup> *State Trials*, iii, 447–449 (Reay's 'Relation').

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 450–452.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 451.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 451–452.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 451.

<sup>58</sup> Reay's first Examination, *State Trials*, iii, 430–32 (Trial of James, Lord Ochiltree).

Weston, who in turn took the story to the king. Whereas Reay stressed in his first examination that 'he knew nothing against the person of the marquis', Ochiltree, by contrast, quickly put Hamilton at the head of the plot.<sup>59</sup> On 16 May he submitted a list to Weston of Hamilton's kinsmen and relations in Scotland in which he described the marquis as the 'prime agent' and the earls of Melrose, Roxburgh and Buccleuch as the 'Plotters'.<sup>60</sup> On the same day, Ochiltree told the king:

That the business was a Treason intended against his Majesty, and the party was the marquis of Hamilton, as this examinant was informed; and that it was the filthiest treason that ever was intended.<sup>61</sup>

A week later Ochiltree was at it again. In a fit of panic, after hearing that Hamilton was on his way to court he pressed the king to flee London, finally warning Charles, 'Sir, now we know the business, but know not the time; and therefore, sir, either do or die.'<sup>62</sup> Thus ended Ochiltree's second attempt to have Hamilton apprehended before he came to the king, after having similarly failed to have him imprisoned in Scotland.<sup>63</sup>

If Ramsay's drunken complaints of a Popish Court and his veneration of Hamilton as a Protestant crusader combined to make Reay suspicious of the motives of some members of the expedition, the treasonous utterings of the third main character in this affair, Robert Meldrum, tainted everyone. On his return to Stockholm from England in July, Meldrum, like Ramsay before him, told Reay of the pervasive influence of papists and Arminians at court and the desire for peace with Spain. Being now both suspicious and warming to his task, Reay instructed his lieutenant colonel, the laird of Bensho, to spy on Meldrum and jointly they accumulated evidence that Reay believed pointed to a plot. In one conversation, after Meldrum had declared that Charles should be immured behind a wall, Reay queried how that could be effected. In reply, Meldrum outlined a plot using Hamilton's army to seize the main Scottish castles and invade England. He also claimed to be composing a declaration arguing the justness of Hamilton's cause, his title to the Scottish crown and the 'tyrannical' methods of church government under James and Charles.<sup>64</sup> Without a doubt, Meldrum's statements were treasonous, whether all or part of Reay's account was true. Nevertheless, they were the warped imaginings of a man alienated from the king's political and religious policies, rather than the lineaments of an organised plot. Indeed, Meldrum's revolutionary blueprint stands in contrast to the vague rumblings of discontent from Ramsay. Most important, however, it was Meldrum's, not Ramsay's, rantings that Reay decided to believe. What is more, rather than moderating Reay's unbalanced view, Ochiltree drifted further into the realm of fantasy.

A number of questions beg answers from this narrative. Most obviously, what do we know about Reay, Ramsay and especially Ochiltree's background which may throw light on their motives? Let us begin with David Ramsay. Ramsay was one of the chief organisers of Hamilton's expedition. His association with Hamilton extended back to at least 1620 when he was part of the young earl of Arran's company on his first presentation at court.<sup>65</sup> He also spent some time with Hamilton during the enforced exile on the island of Arran in 1628, carrying correspondence between Arran and

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 432 (Reay's first Examination).

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 435–436 ('The Tenor of the List'). The three accused earls' kinsmen and relations were also listed.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 429 (Ochiltree's Examination, 20 June, 1631).

<sup>62</sup> W.R.O., Fielding of Newnham Paddox, CR 2017/C2/177 (Roger Fielding to earl of Denbigh, 20 February, 1631/2); *State Trials*, iii, 430.

<sup>63</sup> W.R.O. Fielding of Newnham Paddox, CR 2017/C2/177 (Roger Fielding to earl of Denbigh, 20 February, 1631/2).

<sup>64</sup> 'Reay's Relation', *State Trials*, iii, 449–50, Meldrum claimed that nine Scottish earls and some of the English nobility backed the plot. On hearing of the birth of the Prince of Wales, Meldrum apparently said it would have no effect on the plot as the king and queen of Bohemia had promised their daughter to Hamilton, *Ibid.*, 449.

<sup>65</sup> See above and NRS Hamilton MSS Lennoxlove, TD/90/73/F1/25/7 (Account book of earl of Arran's expenses November 1620–May 1621).

Edinburgh, and probably to court.<sup>66</sup> Ramsay's connection with the Stewart court went back even further. He held an indeterminate court position under James VI and then, predictably enough given his views, became a groom of the bedchamber to Prince Henry.<sup>67</sup> Later, under Charles, he served as a gentleman of the privy chamber, but it is uncertain whether he held that place between 1612 and 1625.<sup>68</sup> Be that as it may, by 1631 Ramsay was an established figure at court, with a position in the king's household and a client relationship with Hamilton. Indeed his brother, Sir James Ramsay, as has already been noted, commanded one of Hamilton's English regiments.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, the marquis's close ally at court, Robert Kerr, earl of Roxburgh, and James Hamilton, earl of Abercorn, the head of the main cadet branch of the Hamiltons, both stood surety for David Ramsay during the trial in the High Court of Chivalry.<sup>70</sup> More significantly, Hamilton had asked Roxburgh to support Ramsay before he left for Germany.<sup>71</sup> Therefore Hamilton, though absent in Germany, continued to back Ramsay against Reay when it would have been more prudent to sever all ties with him.<sup>72</sup>

The reputation of Sir Donald Mackay, first Lord Reay rested on his military exploits in the service of Denmark and Sweden.<sup>73</sup> Charles I ennobled him on 20 June 1628 as a reward for service in the German Wars under the king's uncle, Christian IV of Denmark.<sup>74</sup> In 1626, with the assistance of James, Lord Ochiltree, Reay raised troops in Scotland to aid Ernst, Count Mansfeld in Germany.<sup>75</sup> For a two year period starting in 1626, he served Christian IV and in 1629 moved to Gustavus Adolphus, quickly becoming one of the main Scottish officers recruiting for the king of Sweden.<sup>76</sup>

As a result, Reay was involved at an early stage in activities relating to Hamilton's campaign. He discussed Hamilton's propositions with Gustavus and was empowered to conclude with Hamilton in all things concerning the expedition.<sup>77</sup> Reay also offered to serve in Hamilton's army and

<sup>66</sup> NRS Hamilton mss Lennoxlove, TD/90/73/F1/50 ([unfol.]Account of extraordinary expenses, February–September 1628).

<sup>67</sup> *DNB.*, xlvii, p. 240. Ramsay was awarded a pension of £200 sterling shortly after Prince Henry died. For his employment with James VI, NRS GD 406/1/1604 ([Hamilton] to Sir John Banks, 26 March 1642). One Ramsay was part of a group who ran at the ring with Prince Charles in February 1612, N. E. M. McClure ed., *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, (2 vols, Philadelphia 1939), i, 399; 'David Ramsay (d.1642)', Oxford DNB, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/23079>.

<sup>68</sup> *State Trials*, iii, 496; NRS GD 406/1/1604, in this letter Hamilton infers that Ramsay had been in continual royal service from at least 1603–42. On Ramsay's receipt of royal favour see TNA, SP 16/131/5 (Ramsay's petition to the king, 2 January 1628/9 and answer, 10 March 1628/9).

<sup>69</sup> Another brother, Sir George Ramsay, was also involved in the mobilisation, TNA, SP 16/195/12 (Lord Paulet to Dorchester, [? 1631]).

<sup>70</sup> Bodleian Library, MSS Rawlinson. D. 719, XII, fol.350v; *State Trials*, iii, 501. Abercorn was later unavailable and the earl of Buccleuch took his place, Rawlinson, D. 719, XII, fol.365r.

<sup>71</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9268 (Roxburgh to Hamilton, 1 July 1631). See also GD 406/1/9269 (Lord Goring to Hamilton, 1 September 1631).

<sup>72</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9275 (Roxburgh to Hamilton, 23 September 1631); GD 406/1/86 (Roxburgh to Hamilton, [September–May 1631–32]); GD 406/1/241 (Roxburgh to Hamilton, 17 March 1631/2). Burnet's claim that Hamilton had 'no interest at all' in Ramsay and knew nothing about him is misleading, probably deliberately, Burnet, *Memoirs of the Hamiltons* (1852), p.8.

<sup>73</sup> See, for example, R. Monro, *Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment (called Mac-keyes Regiment) levied in August 1626, by Sr D. Mac-key Lord Rhees ...* (London 1637); I. Grimble, *Chief of Mackay*, (London 1965); J. A. Fallon, 'Scottish Mercenaries', (PhD Glasgow 1972); Oxford DNB, 'Donald Mackay, first Lord Reay (1591–1649)' <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/17556>.

<sup>74</sup> NRS Reay MSS, GD 84/2/171 (Extract act of Privy Council, 8 July 1628); G.E.C., *Complete Peerage*, x, 753.

<sup>75</sup> NRS GD 84/2/149 (Letter of Agreement, 4 March 1626). Ochiltree signed the letter on behalf of Mackay; GD 84/2/151 (Commission to levy 3,000 Scots, Mansfeld to Mackay, 9 April 1626); GD 84/2/153 (Warrant to transport 3,000 men, Charles I to Mackay, 21 July 1626). These troops may have been sent to Denmark after Mansfeld's death in 1626. I owe this observation to Richard Brzezinski.

<sup>76</sup> For Christian IV, see NRS GD 84/2/160, 161, 168, 170; *Complete Peerage*, x, 753. For Gustavus Adolphus, see also GD 84/2/174, 175; see the 'List' in Monro, *Expedition*, no page number, located between volumes I and II.

<sup>77</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9320 (Reay to Hamilton, 15 January 1630/1); *HMC Hamilton*, 70 (18), (19).

a commission was being negotiated up till the disclosure of the plot.<sup>78</sup> More to the point, during Hamilton's recruitment-drive Reay operated a parallel levy in Scotland and Ireland for Gustavus amounting to 2,000 men in Scotland and three regiments in Ireland.<sup>79</sup> Crucially, however, Reay's recruitment campaign was suspended until Hamilton's was completed.<sup>80</sup> This assumed even greater importance to Reay's prestige after Count Tilly, the leader of the Catholic League's forces, successfully stormed New Brandenburg in March 1631, resulting in further losses to Reay's regiments in Germany. Gustavus quickly assured Reay that the Scottish and Irish levies would be used to rebuild the depleted regiments.<sup>81</sup> At this level therefore, there may have been some rivalry between Hamilton and Reay in their efforts to secure scarce resources. Furthermore, Reay was aware that Hamilton enjoyed Charles's support and with it a considerable advantage.<sup>82</sup>

Another source of irritation was the money owed to Reay by Christian IV of Denmark who had passed the debt on account to Charles I.<sup>83</sup> One of the sums stood at 18,304 rix dollars (£4,576 sterling).<sup>84</sup> The debt was not satisfied by September 1632 despite Reay holding privy seals dated from May 1629.<sup>85</sup> In early 1631 Reay entreated Dorchester to intercede with the king on his behalf to secure payment.<sup>86</sup> Curiously enough, there are copies of some of the letters that passed between Christian IV and Charles I concerning Reay's debts amongst the Hamilton Papers.<sup>87</sup> This puzzle may be explained in two ways. Firstly, Reay may have sent the letters to Hamilton to try and solicit his aid, either in 1629 or, more plausibly, during their correspondence in 1630 and 1631. Secondly, they could have been sent to Hamilton, or requested by him, during the initial examination of the plot. Reay, therefore, may have been aggrieved at Charles's financial support for Hamilton in the face of these outstanding debts.<sup>88</sup> From this evidence it seems likely that Reay felt some antipathy towards Hamilton, sufficient perhaps, to encourage him to make use of the loose-tongued complaints of Ramsay and the fanciful meanderings of Meldrum. In fact, it was rumoured around court that Reay had been motivated by 'spleen'.<sup>89</sup> Equally, Reay's resolution to confide in Ochiltree, notwithstanding their friendship, was significant given the latter's historical connection with the Hamiltons.

Evidence for enmity towards Hamilton is more compelling in the case of James Stewart, Lord Ochiltree (1615–1658). He was the son of Captain James Stewart of Bothwellmuir, the unchallenged

<sup>78</sup> Reay offered to 'traill a pik[e]' under Hamilton, NRS GD 406/1/9320; *State Trials*, iii, 449, 451.

<sup>79</sup> For the Scottish levies, see NRS GD 84/2/180 (Commission, Gustavus to Mackay, 2 December 1630); and the Irish, GD 84/2/183 (Articles of agreement between Reay and Crosbie, 20 April 1631).

<sup>80</sup> *CSPV 1631–33*, 516. I am grateful to Richard Brzezinski for this reference. See also, *CSPD 1631–33*, 113, 124.

<sup>81</sup> NRS GD 84/2/181 (Gustavus to Mackay, 15 March 1631). For an account of the storm of New Brandenburg and the losses, M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus: a history of Sweden, 1611–1632* (2 vols., London 1953–8), ii, 477–480.

<sup>82</sup> NRS GD 84/2/184 (Gustavus to Reay, 14 July 1631).

<sup>83</sup> The debt was for Reay's outlay of money and arrears while in the King of Denmark's employment, NRS GD 84/2/160 (Mackay to Christian IV, 10 May 1627); GD 84/2/161 (Mackay to Christian IV, 28 May 1627); GD 84/2/167 (Frederick, Elector Palatine to [?], 25 July 1627).

<sup>84</sup> NRS GD 84/2/173 ([Copy] Discharge by Reay, 11 May 1629). On the same date, 4 October, Christian IV asked Charles to honour the debt, NRS GD 406/1/9656 ([Copy] Christian IV to Charles I, 4 October, 1628). Charles wrote back on 30 May 1629 accepting the debt, NRS GD 406/1/9657.

<sup>85</sup> NRS GD 84/2/192 (Power of Attorney, Mackay to David Cunningham, 6 September [1632]). Cunningham received £500 out of a £3,000 privy seal warrant dated 12 May 1629, on 10 October 1632. Whether the other privy seal[s] had been satisfied by that time remains uncertain.

<sup>86</sup> In January 1631, Mackay was in Elsinore where he was again put off by the parliament and council until Charles paid what he owed Denmark, TNA, SP 75/12/ fos.26r–v (Reay to Dorchester, 22 January 1631).

<sup>87</sup> NRS GD406/1/9656, 9657.

<sup>88</sup> Bodleian Library, MSS Rawlinson, D.719, XII, 356v–357r. The debt was not mentioned during the trial; however, Reay's counsel were at pains to stress his financial independence, saying that he did not rely on military employment to live.

<sup>89</sup> W.R.O., Feilding of Newnham Paddox mss, CR 2017/C2/177 (Roger Feilding to earl of Denbigh, 20 February 1631/2). See also, Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 125–6.

favourite of the young James VI between 1580 and 1584.<sup>90</sup> Captain Stewart was related to the Hamiltons as second son of Andrew, lord Ochiltree, whose mother was the only child of James Hamilton, 1st earl of Arran by his first wife.<sup>91</sup> Exploiting the attainder of the Hamilton brothers in 1579, and his appointment as tutor to his incapacitated kinsman, James, 3<sup>rd</sup> earl of Arran, he persuaded the king that the children from the 1st earl of Arran's second wife were illegitimate and as a result, was created earl of Arran, Lord Aven and Hamilton on 28 October 1581.<sup>92</sup> When Stewart's dominance ended in 1585, the Hamiltons returned to favour, the forfeiture was revoked and the earldom of Arran restored.<sup>93</sup> Just as Captain Stewart responded to an hereditary animus in 1581, it is likely that his son reacted similarly half a century later. Ochiltree also inherited his father's overweening ambition and successfully purchased the lordship of Ochiltree in 1615 from his cousin.<sup>94</sup> Ochiltree was also one of the principal supporters of the revocation scheme at court, a stance that may have put him at odds with Hamilton and some of the other lords accused.<sup>95</sup> There were many reasons then, to explain why Ochiltree was willing to believe anything harmful to Hamilton. His swift compilation of a list of Hamilton's relations and political clientele in Scotland was intended to inflict the widest possible damage to the marquis's complex and powerful family network.<sup>96</sup>

On a broader canvas, Hamilton's expedition was linked to future foreign policy objectives and so had its opponents and supporters.<sup>97</sup> Reay and Ochiltree's decision to take the story to Lord Treasurer Weston reflected the divisions at court. It would have fitted with Weston's anti-war policy to frustrate the expedition by giving credence to the plot accusations, and to some extent that was what he did.<sup>98</sup> But when he realised that the king was not about to abandon Hamilton, he quickly drew back and later tried to proffer the olive branch.<sup>99</sup> For instance, while Hamilton was abroad he and Weston corresponded regularly, exchanged expressions of respect, support and mutual friendship, and the treasurer helped to organise the christening of Hamilton's second daughter.<sup>100</sup>

Following the revelations, a series of examinations were held in June 1631 and the lord treasurer presided as commissioner. The examining committee was made up of three Englishmen, the commissioner, the lord keeper and the earl marshal, and three Scotsmen, the earl of Morton (lord treasurer of Scotland), the earl of Menteith (president of the Scottish Privy Council) and the earl of Carlisle (groom of the stool).<sup>101</sup> The king was present throughout and it was he who judged Hamilton and the other Scots lords – Roxburgh, Haddington and Buccleuch – innocent, later announcing his decision to the English Privy Council and in writing to its Scottish counterpart.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>90</sup> For Captain James Stewart, Sir J. Balfour Paul, *The Scots Peerage* 9 vols (Edinburgh 1904–14, ), i, 394–7; *Complete Peerage*, i, 222–223.

<sup>91</sup> Balfour, *Scots Peerage*, i, 394.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 394–97; *Complete Peerage*, i, 222–223. The earl of Arran resigned the title to Captain Stewart in 1581, but he was mentally unfit to do so.

<sup>93</sup> *Complete Peerage*, i, 222–223.

<sup>94</sup> Balfour, *Scots Peerage*, vi, 517. He was tacksman and sheriff of Orkney and Shetland between 1613 and 1622, and, in 1629, spearheaded the failed attempt to establish a colony on the Cape Breton coast, *Cal.S.P.Colonial, America and West Indies, 1574–1660*, 104–6; *Complete Peerage*, x, 8.

<sup>95</sup> For Hamilton and the revocation see chapter 1 pp.17–19. For Ochiltree, see MacInnes, 'The Origins and Organisation of the Covenanting Movement, 1625–41.' (unpublished PhD dissertation, 2 vols. University of Glasgow, 1987), i, 313.

<sup>96</sup> *State Trials*, iii, 435–6 (Trial of James Lord Ochiltree).

<sup>97</sup> Rumours abounded on who wanted Hamilton's expedition discredited. The Spaniards were the most commonly cited; others traced the smear to Brussels. Even the French were suspicious of the expedition, *CSPV, 1629–32*, 526–527.

<sup>98</sup> His biographer has claimed that Weston exploited the situation to try to 'destroy' Hamilton's influence, M.C. Alexander, *Charles I's Lord Treasurer* (London, 1975), p. 181. See also Reeve, *Road*, p. 267, n. 191.

<sup>99</sup> Apparently Weston initially took the story to Charles unaware that Hamilton was implicated, but this is perhaps debatable, *State Trials*, iii, 428–429.

<sup>100</sup> Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 102–103; NRS GD 406/1/266 (Will. Murray to Hamilton, 19 March 1631/2). See below.

<sup>101</sup> Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 125–126 (Pory to Puckering, 16 June 1631); *Ibid.*, 126 (Beaulieu to Puckering, 29 June 1631).

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*; *CSPV, 1629–32*, 526–527; *RPCS., 2nd Series, 1630–32*, 263 (King to Council, 29 June 1631). The earls of Haddington, Roxburgh and Buccleuch were also declared innocent.

Consequently, the two who had implicated Hamilton were summarily dealt with. Meldrum was committed to prison in London and Ochiltree sent to Scotland for trial as a leasing maker, that is, a sower of sedition.<sup>103</sup> Ochiltree was tried by assize in the last two months of 1631 in Edinburgh. His lawyers argued, with some justification, that Ochiltree could not be tried in Scotland for offences committed in England, and that the depositions were invalid because they were all copies, albeit authenticated by five English privy councillors and the king.<sup>104</sup> After failing to resolve these and other legal nuances, the trial was postponed and, on reappearing on 1 February 1632, Ochiltree was committed to perpetual imprisonment.<sup>105</sup> He remained in prison for twenty years without a full trial and was eventually released by the English Commonwealth in 1652, a broken man.<sup>106</sup>

Determining the fate of Lord Reay and David Ramsay was even more difficult. Unlike Ochiltree, however, Reay did not implicate Hamilton in the plot and took care to clear him early in his examination.<sup>107</sup> The main obstacle to putting Reay and Ramsay to a legal trial was the absence of witnesses to their conversations. A proceeding in common law required two witnesses and, in the words of Lord Coke:

It seemeth that by the antient Common Law one accuser or witness was not sufficient to convict any person of High Treason, for in that case where is but one accuser it shall be tried before the Constable or Marshal by combat, as by many records appeareth.<sup>108</sup>

Conveniently, Ramsay challenged Reay in the presence of the king and Charles subsequently referred the case to a High Court of Chivalry.<sup>109</sup> For the trial, the earl of Lindsay was made lord high constable of England presiding with the earl marshal, Thomas, earl of Arundel. They were assisted by nine lords of the privy councils and Sir Henry Marten, judge of the High Court of Admiralty. Included, were the lord chamberlains of the king and queen's households and the three Scots lords from the preliminary examination.<sup>110</sup>

The court met on nine occasions: the first meeting was on 28 November 1631 and the last on 18 February 1632, the painted chamber at the back of the parliament house being modified to accommodate the court.<sup>111</sup> In their opening speeches both the earl marshal and the king's advocate for the Marshal Court, Dr. Duck, stressed the legitimacy of the proceeding while going on to

<sup>103</sup> Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 125–126, says Meldrum was committed during the examination. For Ochiltree, see *State Trials*, iii, 425–454 (The Trial of James Lord Ochiltree for calumnies and slanderous speeches against James, marquis of Hamilton ... etc). Rumours were circulating court in December that Ochiltree had been beheaded in Edinburgh, Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 151.

<sup>104</sup> *State Trials*, iii, 440–441.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*, 452.

<sup>106</sup> *RPCS, 2nd series, 1630–32*, 263.

<sup>107</sup> At the end of his first examination Reay 'protested he knew nothing against the person of the marquis; but that he was, for aught this examinant knew, as good a subject as any the King had.' *State Trials*, iii, 432.

<sup>108</sup> Quoted in a note in *State Trials*, iii, 483 (Proceedings in the court of chivalry on an appeal of High Treason: by Donald, Lord Reay against Mr David Ramsay); G.D. Squibb, *The High Court of Chivalry* (Oxford 1959), p. 52. For Whitelock's opinion see *Ibid*, 495.

<sup>109</sup> W.R.O., Feilding of Newnham Paddox, CR 2017/C2/177 (Roger Feilding to earl of Denbigh, 20 February 1631/2); *State Trials*, iii, 495, 497.

<sup>110</sup> The best account of the trial is Oxford, Bodleian Library MSS Rawlinson D. 719, XII, fos.350–366. The nine lords were Philip, earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, lord chamberlain of the king's household; Edward, earl of Dorset, lord chamberlain of the queen's household; James, earl of Carlisle, groom of the stool; Edmund, earl of Mulgrave; William, earl of Morton; William, earl of Srathearn; Edward, Viscount Wimbledon; Thomas, Viscount Wentworth; Henry, Viscount Falkland, *State Trials*, iii, 495.

<sup>111</sup> The following account is taken from Bodleian Library, MSS Rawlinson. D. 719, XII, fos.350–366. There is an incomplete copy of this account in the Hamilton MSS, presumably the one Hamilton consulted when he returned from Germany, Lennoxlove, Hamilton MSS TD 90/73/Bundle 1371. Two more meetings were held in the council chamber at Whitehall, one on 10 April to prorogue the combat from 12 April to 17 May, and another, on 12 May, to cancel the combat and commit both men to the Tower till sureties were given and approved by the king, *State Trials*, iii, 511–513.

emphasise that combat would be awarded only when all other ways had been exhausted to find the truth.<sup>112</sup> Nevertheless, after a thorough re-examination of the evidence there was found to be insufficient proof to convict Ramsay. Trial by combat was therefore awarded, to be fought in presence of the king in Tothill fields, Westminster on 15 April 1632.<sup>113</sup> Of the two protagonists Ramsay fared the worst in the court. He regularly lost his temper, ignored legal counsel, tried to cast off his sureties and demanded the combat. On each occasion he was persuaded to follow the form of the court, but his behaviour created an unfavourable impression on the constable, earl marshal and the king.<sup>114</sup>

The conclusion of the affair was determined by Charles. After proroguing the combat until 17 May, he eventually decided not to allow the protagonists to fight and gave his reasons to Hamilton in a long letter, in his own hand, dated 8 May. Upon 'mature deliberation' the king had decided:

that though upon want of full prooffe, the combatt was necessarilie awarded, yet upon the whole matter I am fully satisfied that there was no suche Treason as Mackay fancied: & for D. Ramsay though wee must cleere him of that Treason in particular yet not so far in generall but that he might give occasion anufe by his tonge of great accusation, if it had bene rightlie placed, as by his foolish presumtius cariage did appeare.<sup>115</sup>

In concluding, Charles urged Hamilton to have no further dealings with the 'pest' Ramsay and again assured him that he would have 'no dishonour in this bussiness'.<sup>116</sup> A further two points emerged from the trial, one specific and the other general. Firstly, great care was taken to emphasise Hamilton's innocence of any complicity in the whole affair.<sup>117</sup> Secondly, the resort to trial by combat as a legitimate means to decide appeals to treason had now been reintroduced into legal proceedings in England.<sup>118</sup>

However, this was not the last time that Hamilton's name was linked to the Scottish crown. It happened again in 1638, just as he was about to leave the king for another extended period, this time as royal commissioner to settle the troubles in Scotland.<sup>119</sup> Undoubtedly, Hamilton was proud of his descent from the Royal Stewarts and Charles, like his father before him, chose to keep the Lennox and Hamilton heirs close to him. That Hamilton had been accused and cleared of aspiring to the Scottish crown so early in his career had two long term consequences. First, in rather spectacular fashion, it advertised the fact that Hamilton actually was a blood relation. But it meant that Hamilton never shook off the association between him and coveting the Scottish crown. The blood link stuck in the contemporary mind. Second, and more important, the attempt to discredit him made the king more reluctant to listen to any attempt to blacken his friend's name. This was something that Hamilton used with great skill, at least until the 'Incident' in October 1641.

#### IV

We turn now to Hamilton's campaign in Germany. The aim is to examine not only the military consequences but, more importantly, its effect on the course of Caroline foreign policy. In doing

<sup>112</sup> Bodleian Library, MSS Rawlinson D. 719, XII, fos.350v–351v. Apparently the bishops were unwilling to concede that such combats were lawful by God's word, *CSPD*, 1631–33, 119 (Edward Nicholas to John Pennington, 23 July 1631).

<sup>113</sup> Bodleian Library Oxford, MSS Rawlinson D. 719, XII, fos.364v–365r.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, fos.350v, 352v, 353v, 355v–356r, 359r, 361v, 362r–v, 363r.

<sup>115</sup> NRS GD 406/1/159/1 (Charles I to Hamilton, 8 May 1632).

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.* See also, NRS GD 406/1/9306 (Will. Murray to Hamilton, 2 August 1632); GD 406/1/160 (King to Hamilton, 1 August 1632).

<sup>117</sup> Bodleian Library, MSS Rawlinson D. 719, XII, fos.358v–359r.

<sup>118</sup> For more on this see J. S. A. Adamson, 'The Baronial Context of the English Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Series, xl (1990), pp.93–120.

<sup>119</sup> See chapter 6, pp.140–41, 146. It also happened in 1643.

so, the level of Hamilton's political credit at court, especially with the king, can be measured. The interrelationship between Hamilton's experience serving the Swedish king and the failure of the projected Anglo-Swedish alliance will be insisted upon. Hamilton's censorious letters to Charles about the king of Sweden offered a telling example of the consequences of a half-hearted European commitment, an example that Charles weighed against the price of a full commitment, bringing with it loss of trade, loss of customs revenue and possibly war with Spain. And the unpleasant necessity of calling a parliament in England. It was no mere coincidence, in fact, that the failure of Sir Henry Vane's embassy coincided with Hamilton's final estrangement from Gustavus Adolphus. For most of Hamilton's period abroad, there were clear differences between his aspirations and the aims of the Swedish king. Hamilton expected better treatment, in terms of military and financial assistance as well as service near or in the Palatinate territories. Yet Gustavus saw Hamilton merely as a diversion in the field, and as a snare to draw Charles into a full military alliance.<sup>120</sup> Finally, and most importantly, Charles, and certainly Hamilton, were not always as prominent in the Swedish king's military and political programme as they perhaps imagined. The march on Vienna was Gustavus's main objective and all other considerations, including the liberation of the Palatinate, were secondary.<sup>121</sup>

The expedition was initially to anchor on the river Weser and occupy the territory of the archbishop of Bremen, Gustavus's uncle.<sup>122</sup> However, at very short notice the plan was altered and the expedition landed 230 miles up the coast near Wolgast in Pomerania on 31 July.<sup>123</sup> After landing his troops, Hamilton received orders to march along the river Oder towards Silesia to meet General Alexander Leslie with the auxiliary troops that were to bolster the expeditionary force.<sup>124</sup> As his troops headed for the rendezvous with Leslie, Hamilton went to a council with Gustavus at Werben on the Elbe, about 100 miles west, where the Swedish king faced Tilly's army.<sup>125</sup> At the meeting Gustavus expressed regret that Hamilton had landed in a ruined part of the country, but explained that he could offer no help and they parted after clarification of the orders.<sup>126</sup> On 3 September, James Spens, Baron Orholm was despatched to act as Gustavus's agent in Hamilton's army.<sup>127</sup>

Unfortunately, no detailed record of Hamilton's first meeting with the Swedish king has survived, but a description of his entry into Stettin on 28 August has, and it highlights important aspects

<sup>120</sup> TNA SP 75/12/ fos.26r-v (Lord Reay to Dorchester, 22 January 1631/2).

<sup>121</sup> I am very grateful to Simon Adams for discussions around these points.

<sup>122</sup> *HMC, Hamilton*, 71(24) (Salvius to Hamilton, 16/26 April 1631). See also *HMC, Hamilton*, 72 (26) (Instructions to colonel Alexander Leslie, 1631); *HMC, Hamilton*, 73(31) (Salvius to Hamilton, 4/14 July 1631).

<sup>123</sup> Gustavus was disappointed that the marquis did not land at the Weser, *HMC, Hamilton*, 73 (32) (Gustavus to Hamilton, 3 August 1631). Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, ii, 608, posits that Hamilton was forced to land in Pomerania rather than the Weser 'largely because Gustav Adolf had been unable to fulfil his promise to provide a strong detachment to cover the landing' but does not cite a source. The decision to alter the landing area was clearly taken late on, TNA SP 16/199/5 (Pennington to lords of the Admiralty, 2 September 1631); TNA SP 16/196/72 (Hamilton to Dorchester, [15 July] 1631); NRS GD 406/1/273 (Dorchester to Hamilton, 16 July 1631).

<sup>124</sup> TNA SP 16/199/5 (Pennington to lords of the Admiralty, 2 September 1631). It took at least 3–4 days to land, arm and billet the soldiers. The queen of Sweden had recently landed at the same town with an army of 8,000, *The Swedish Intelligencer, the first part* (3rd edition 1632) pp.108–9; *HMC Hamilton*, 73(32) (Gustavus to Hamilton, 3 August 1631). For the reaction in Brussels to Hamilton's arrival, NRS GD 406/208 (B. Gerbier to Hamilton, 25 August [o.s.] 1631).

<sup>125</sup> *Swedish Intelligencer*, pp.108–9; NRS GD406/1/10454 (Gustavus to Hamilton, 3 August 1631) noted in *HMC Hamilton*, 73(32).

<sup>126</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9355 ([Draft] Hamilton to Charles I, [Early August 1631]). Monro, *Expedition*, ii, 52–53 gives a general account of the meeting between Hamilton and Gustavus at Werben. For an accurate account of Hamilton's orders written in his own hand from Stettin on the Oder, TNA SP 95/3/ fol.107r (Hamilton to Dorchester, 22 August [1631]).

<sup>127</sup> NRS GD 406/1/10456 (Gustavus to Hamilton, 3 September 1631). For Spens's career in Swedish service, Fallon, 'Scottish Mercenaries', chapter 10 esp. pp. 251–261. 'James Spens of Wormiston, Baron Spens', Oxford DNB <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/26142>. Spens's daughter was married to Sir James Ramsay.

of Hamilton's public image.<sup>128</sup> According to the account Hamilton's procession radiated grandeur and power and was compared to that of General Albrecht Von Wallenstein (1583–1634), one the great commanders of the Imperial side. Hamilton entered the town in a carriage drawn by six beautiful horses attired with richly decorated harnesses. His domestic servants wore magnificent liveries and carried banners with his coat of arms on both sides in gilt, topped with gold coronets.<sup>129</sup> Outwardly, therefore, Hamilton projected to the full his position as Charles's proxy, as master of the horse, knight of the Garter, general of the army and the king's cousin.<sup>130</sup> An amalgamation of these elements motivated Hamilton to fight alongside the king of Sweden to restore the king and queen of Bohemia to their rightful possessions. It is in this context, that we must view Hamilton's indignation at his poor treatment by Gustavus.

Between August and early November, Hamilton advanced along the Oder, relieved the siege of Crossen, took the city of Guben and attempted to secure the area along the river between Custrin and Crossen, while refortifying Frankfort.<sup>131</sup> On 15 September, two days before the battle of Breitenfeld, he was instructed to lie before Custrin to secure Gustavus's retreat in the event of a Swedish defeat.<sup>132</sup> The aim was additionally to secure the strategic areas in the region against the 22,000 strong Silesian army.<sup>133</sup> Hamilton initially used Frankfort, and later Custrin, as a base, sending out regiments on specific missions, such as to relieve the siege of Crossen.<sup>134</sup> In his letters to court, Hamilton's enthusiasm for the campaign was often contrasted with his frustration at the king of Sweden. A typical example began with news of the relief of Crossen and went on to give a detailed account of Leslie's successful attack on Guben with 600 men, resulting in the capture of 250 prisoners, all of whom joined Hamilton's army. The majority of the garrison escaped, however, prompting a bitter outburst from the twenty-five year old nobleman:

This I dar[e] be bould to say, if I had beine so happ[i]e, as thatt the half of thoes forsis I expeckted from the King had come to me (bot they heave bein sloe of marching for I heave sein non of them as yeitt saif 400 futt and 200 hors[e]) thatt ... without greatt los[s] I woold heave cout of[f] 2000 men and takin 22 peis of ordinans.

So the limited success of the campaign in Silesia was squarely blamed on Gustavus. Yet later in the same letter, Hamilton revealed the real cause of his frustration. On the same evening that he had resolved to lay siege to Glogau, the second city of Silesia, he received orders to follow the king into middle-Germany, mainly because of an agreement that the elector of Saxony would move against the Silesian army.<sup>135</sup> Bristling with indignation at his treatment, he declared to the earl of Carlisle, 'yeitt if thoes promised forsis of his had beine cam to me, I woold heaue ventered a chydng

<sup>128</sup> Eleazer de [Mauvillon], *Histoire de Gustave-Adolphe ... sur tout ce qui a para de plus curieux at sur in grande nombre de manusscrits et principalement sur ceux de M. Arkenholtz* 4 vols (Amsterdam, 1764), iii, p.352. I am very grateful to Richard Brzezinski for sending me a transcript of the Mauvillon passage.

<sup>129</sup> [Mauvillon], *Histoire de Gustave-Adolphe*, iii, p.352. The poet Sir John Suckling was one of the 40 gentlemen who attended Hamilton, W. Carew-Hazlitt, ed., *The Poems, Plays and Other Remains of Sir John Suckling*. (1892), p.xxi.

<sup>130</sup> Hamilton was made a knight of the Garter in the ceremonies between 5–7 October 1630, Bodleian Library, MSS Ashmole, 1132, fol.124a. It was a clear indication of Charles's endorsement of Hamilton's military aspirations, *CSPV, 1629–32*, 432.

<sup>131</sup> British Library, Egerton MSS 2597, iv, fos.53r-54r (Hamilton to Carlisle, [after 20 September 1631]); *HMC Hamilton*, 74(38) (Gustavus to Hamilton, 30 October 1631); *Swedish Intelligencer*, pp.108–9.

<sup>132</sup> Wedgwood, C.V. *The Thirty Years War* (London, 1992), pp.297–303; Parker, Geoffrey. *The Thirty Years War* (London, 1984), pp.126, 164, 192–193.

<sup>133</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9356 (Hamilton to Charles I, [after 7 September 1631]) noted in *HMC Hamilton*, 76–77(49).

<sup>134</sup> B.L., Egerton 2597, iv, fos.53r-54r. See also a draft of this letter, NRS GD 406/1/9357 printed in *HMC Hamilton*, 77 (50).

<sup>135</sup> *HMC Hamilton*, 73 (35) (Gustavus to Hamilton, 20 September 1631).

and wintered ther [Silesia].<sup>136</sup> Piqued at his treatment, Hamilton announced that he would go to Gustavus at 'ane sloe pase'. In the final paragraph Hamilton stressed the importance of the area to the overall campaign in Germany, but regretted that 'ther is nor so mani prinsis and tounes that offers him [Gustavus] assistans, as he is be cume all most kairles to aske for ani'. Disillusionment dripped from every line, but Hamilton concluded with the hope that greater martial exploits were before him.

A matter of months into the campaign and Hamilton had formed a clear impression of the king of Sweden, that steadily deteriorated during the next year. Whether he liked it or not, he was a pawn in a complex war game and it was this recognition that slowly grew on the eager young nobleman. Of course, Hamilton's frustration must additionally be related to the inhospitable terrain, the condition of his army and lack of pay. In his own words, it was 'ane Countri most miserably wasted, for heir is nothing bot plag[u]e and famin[e].<sup>137</sup> By the time of Gustavus's order to march on 20 September, the army had been reduced by one third through sickness and death from plague.<sup>138</sup> As he had intimated to the earl of Carlisle, Hamilton delayed obeying Gustavus's orders, giving the sickness of his army as an excuse.<sup>139</sup> Undeterred, however, Gustavus insisted on a forward march, despatching General John Baner (1596–1641) to urge Hamilton on and effectively to take joint command of the army.<sup>140</sup> Hamilton's account to Charles concluded with another scathing comment on Gustavus's order:

I must obay his commands for with the letter, order came that the countri shuld intertein me no longer, and the few hoors I had shuld gooe for the Ealbe [to] the King. Itt will coost me six weiks march and I feir the remnant of my mens layves who (tho I say itt) heaith doun him the better sarvis (albeued we heau foght lytell) then trys as mani men ever did.<sup>141</sup>

When Hamilton eventually left his headquarters at Custrin on 15th October 1631, he was forced to leave behind 2,000 men, half of them because of plague and the other half in garrisons.<sup>142</sup> Only 1,500 of his original force marched, along with some Dutch foot and 1,000 Swedish horse.<sup>143</sup> The final order from the king of Sweden was for the army to march to Magdeburg and lay siege to the town.<sup>144</sup>

By December, the army had linked up with Baner's forces to put a combined strength of around 6,500 before Magdeburg.<sup>145</sup> For the next three months Hamilton kept up the siege and came very close to treating for a capitulation in mid-December, when news of the imminent arrival of Field Marshall Gottfried Heinrich Pappenheim (1594–1632) with a reputed army of 12,000 stymied the negotiations.<sup>146</sup> The besiegers expected reinforcements of 5,000 under the Duke of Saxe-Weimar,

<sup>136</sup> B.L., Egerton MSS, 2597, iv, fol.54r.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid*; TNA SP 95/3/107r (Dorchester to Hamilton, 22 August [1631]); TNA SP 16/199/5 (Pennington to lords of the Admiralty, 2 September 1631).

<sup>138</sup> NRS GD 406/1/10458 (Gustavus to Hamilton, 24 September 1631) noted and translated in *HMC Hamilton*, 74(37).

<sup>139</sup> NRS GD 406/1/233 ([Copy] Gustavus to Hamilton, 30 October 1631).

<sup>140</sup> Baner had initially been at Havel to guard the Elbe and aid Hamilton's advance, NRS GD 406/1/10457 (Gustavus to Hamilton, 20 September 1631). But after Hamilton's equivocation he was sent to him 'to remove the difficulties therfore joyninge yr advises together yt shall hereafter governe yr affaires', GD 406/1/233 ([Copy] Gustavus to Hamilton, 30 October 1631).

<sup>141</sup> *HMC Hamilton*, 77–78 (51) (Hamilton to Charles I, [after 20 September 1631]).

<sup>142</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9616 ([Draft] Hamilton to Sir Henry Vane, [17 October] 1631).

<sup>143</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9359 (Hamilton to Charles I, [late 1631]) noted in *HMC Hamilton*, 78 (52).

<sup>144</sup> TNA SP 81/37 fol.116r (Sir Jacob Astley to Dorchester, 11 November 1631).

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid*; NRS GD 406/1/9359 (Hamilton to Charles I, [December] 1631). In this letter Hamilton appears to underestimate the size of his army.

<sup>146</sup> *HMC Hamilton*, 75 (43) (Baner to Hamilton, 16 December, 1631/2) pressing Hamilton to retire and GD 406/1/9368 (Hamilton to Baner, [December], 1631/2) for Hamilton's refusal. The negotiations, around Christmas 1631, between Hamilton and Mansfeld for the capitulation of Magdeburg can be followed through, GD 406/1/9246 ([Hamilton]

and Hamilton eagerly anticipated a battle.<sup>147</sup> In fact, Pappenheim had no such intention for his force was half what he had led the enemy to believe. His intention was to break through the blockade, free the 4,000 Imperialists in Magdeburg and decamp with everything they could carry.<sup>148</sup> Although he had instructions from Gustavus not to hazard the army in a battle, Baner was taken in by the false reports of Pappenheim's numbers and retired allowing the Imperialists to enter Magdeburg on 4 January and leave four days later with the garrison and goods. Baner's decision was not supported by Hamilton. He itched to engage the enemy and complained bitterly to Charles of the general's 'extrem[e] timerusnes'.<sup>149</sup> Shortly after, Hamilton, weary of Baner, retired with the remnants of his army to winter quarters in Halberstadt, his military involvement in the German wars at a virtual end.<sup>150</sup>

Even though Hamilton conceded that his army had 'fo[u]ght lytell', their contribution did have some impact on the course of events in Germany. Hamilton's ally at court, Secretary Dorchester, talked up the significance in a letter to the young adventurer:

The reliefe of Crossen, the surprise of Goubin, & (wch is more) the reputation of your forces that no doubt was operative in the slow resolutions of the Elector of Saxony, & hath served also to disjoyn the Imperialists of Silesia from assisting Tilly at the Battell of Leipsick [Breitenfeld] are both in waight & number notable accessoryes to the victorious progresse of the King of Swede & recompense abundantly the losse of men wth sicknesse & other casualtyes (not unusuall to our English troopes before they are accustomed to the discomodities of the field).<sup>151</sup>

Hamilton's arrival in Germany about a month before the battle of Breitenfeld tipped the balance in favour of Gustavus at that engagement for four reasons. Firstly, his journey to Werben on the Elbe, where the king faced Tilly's army, was enough to prompt the Imperialists to decamp, under the impression that Hamilton had brought his army with him.<sup>152</sup> Secondly, his campaign in Silesia, particularly in fortifying Crossen, was enough to stop the 22,000 strong Silesian army joining Tilly before the battle.<sup>153</sup> Thirdly, the arrival of the expedition provided a fillip to induce the wavering John George, elector of Saxony, to throw in his lot with Sweden, again, critically before Breitenfeld.<sup>154</sup> Finally, the campaign in Silesia and the siege of Magdeburg provided a diversion which Gustavus exploited.<sup>155</sup>

Just as Hamilton had played a major part in persuading Charles to send a special embassy to Gustavus, so his opinion influenced the outcome of the treaty negotiations for a full military alliance between Britain and Sweden. His treatment during the Silesian campaign coloured his advice to Charles. It moved from unconcealed enthusiasm in the first months on the continent, advising

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to [count Wolfgang of Mansfeld, commander of Magdeburg], undated); *HMC Hamilton*, 75–76 (46) (Mansfeld to Hamilton, 28 December 1631); GD 406/1/329 ([Mansfeld to Hamilton, n.d.]). Baner appears to have been at Leipzig when these negotiations were going on, see *HMC Hamilton*, 75 (43); GD 406/1/9643.

<sup>147</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9361 (Hamilton to Charles I, [January 1631/2]); GD 406/1/9360 (Hamilton to Charles I, [undated]).

<sup>148</sup> Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, ii, 689–690.

<sup>149</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9361 (Hamilton to Charles I, [January 1631/2]); *HMC Hamilton*, 78–79 (55) (Hamilton to Charles I, [January 1631/2]).

<sup>150</sup> *HMC Hamilton*, 79 (55) (Hamilton to Charles I, [undated]).

<sup>151</sup> NRS GD 406/1/230 (Dorchester to Hamilton, 13 December 1631).

<sup>152</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9355 ([Draft] Hamilton to Charles I, [August 1631]); SP 81/37 fol.116r (Sir Jacob Astley to Dorchester, 11 November 1631).

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid*; Monro, *Expedition*, ii, 53. The numbers at Breitenfeld were Tilly 35,000 and Gustavus 42,000. Dr Roberts acknowledges that Hamilton had been sent to Silesia to 'brave it out' against a superior force, Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, ii, 535.

<sup>154</sup> TNA SP 81/37 fol.116v; Monro, *Expedition*, ii, 53. Dorchester told Vane to press the second and third points on the king of Sweden during the treaty negotiations, TNA SP 81/37 fos.233v–234r.

<sup>155</sup> Monro, *Expedition*, ii, 53.

Charles to throw in his lot with Gustavus, to more cautious counsel.<sup>156</sup> In late 1631, he told Charles that his aid 'must be royall greatt and tymu[e]lly', but stressed that the army would have to subsist independently, as Gustavus could not be trusted to fulfil his promises. Otherwise, Sweden would 'make the same yuse of thoes me[n] ye send thatt he heaith don[e] of myne which woold turne to ther yuter reuing and prejudiciall to your Mats honour.'<sup>157</sup> For Hamilton therefore his poor treatment was an affront to Charles. A few months later Hamilton railed against 'the exsessif ambitioun and intollerabill pryde of the King of Sued' who would not trust the marquis in the Palatinate territories.<sup>158</sup> Finally, Hamilton asked Charles whether he could even accept a new army from Gustavus after he had suffered so much under him.<sup>159</sup>

At the beginning of October 1631, Charles's ambassador to the king of Sweden, Sir Henry Vane, arrived in Germany.<sup>160</sup> As was normal in Caroline foreign policy, the ambassador's instructions were long-winded and inconclusive. Vane was to treat not only with Gustavus, but also with the king of Denmark and the princes and towns of Germany.<sup>161</sup> He carried a portfolio stuffed with diffuse subjects ranging from trade disputes and crown debts with Denmark to the continuation of the joint Anglo-French efforts to mediate a peace between Poland and Sweden.<sup>162</sup> He did not leave court, therefore, with a clear-cut commission to negotiate a treaty with the king of Sweden. Nor was he allowed to commit Charles to anything until receiving further orders from court.<sup>163</sup> Instead, Vane was to find out what Gustavus expected of the confederation and to stress that Charles was already providing considerable military assistance, principally in the form of Hamilton's expedition.<sup>164</sup> Above all, the foundation of any confederation was restitution of the Palatinate.<sup>165</sup>

A virtue was made out of the fact that the present assistance was given without a formal contract and there was an expectation that a further informal arrangement could be made.<sup>166</sup> As usual, Charles, like his father before him, was hedging his foreign policy bets. Vane's embassy was balanced by talks at Vienna conducted by Sir Robert Anstruther for peaceful restitution of the Palatinate. Vane was to expect word from Anstruther if the negotiations with the Emperor reached a conclusion.<sup>167</sup> If Anstruther was successful, there would be no need for Vane to negotiate an armed alliance; if Anstruther failed, then Vane would perhaps be allowed to negotiate such an alliance.<sup>168</sup> Vane arrived in Hamburg on 6 October 1631 and the next day wrote to Hamilton

<sup>156</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9356 (Hamilton to Charles I, [after 7 September 1631]) noted in *HMC Hamilton*, 76–77(49).

<sup>157</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9360 (Hamilton to Charles I, [Draft or Copy][late 1631]).

<sup>158</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9361 (Hamilton to Charles I, [January 1631/2]); NRS GD 406/1/9365 (Hamilton to Charles I, [late February–April 1632]) printed in *HMC Hamilton*, 79–80 (57).

<sup>159</sup> TNA SP 81/39 fol.183r (Astley's Memorandum, [March 1631/2]).

<sup>160</sup> Controversy surrounded the choice of Sir Henry Vane over Sir Thomas Roe, one of Elizabeth's closest allies at court. For Elizabeth's impression, TNA SP 81/37 fol.43r (Elizabeth to Roe, 1/11 July 1631) and Roe's, Birch, *Court and Times*, ii, 124; *CSPV* 1629–32, 526; TNA SP 16/204/107 (Unsigned Newsletter, 30 December 1631).

<sup>161</sup> TNA SP 75/12 fol.204r ('Instructions for our Counselor Sr Henry Vane ... Ambr. extra. to Kings of Denmark & Swede & the princes & free towns of Germany'). Vane was also to enquire into those implicated in the alleged plot of 1631, TNA SP 95/3 fol.136 (Charles I to Vane, 27 September 1631), TNA SP 16/205/72 (Arundel to Dorchester, undated [1631]).

<sup>162</sup> TNA SP 75/12 fos.204r–209v.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, fos.204r–209v.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.206v. The levies for Sir Thomas Conway's regiment, the master of Forbes's regiment and Sir Frederick Hamilton's regiment were also mentioned. All of these had been levied after Hamilton sailed.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.207r. Vane was also provided with a synopsis of British aid for the restitution of the Palatinate since the invasion, fol.209r.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.206r.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.207r, 208v.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.* See also SP 81/39 fol.377r (Memorandum on Vane's mission). See also, NRS GD 406/1/187 (Vane to Hamilton, 26 October 1631). Many felt that Charles was being outmaneuvered by the Habsburgs, *CSPV*, 1629–32, 526, 537, 550; TNA SP 81/37, fos.77r–v.

urging a meeting before he went to Gustavus.<sup>169</sup> Being friends, the two men quickly joined forces and worked together during the negotiations.<sup>170</sup> Hamilton was now disillusioned enough with the king of Sweden to work with, and in, a more cautious Vane. A few days before receiving Vane's notification Hamilton broke from Custrin and marched towards Magdeburg. After he tended to his depleted army, he caught up with Vane seven miles outside Wittenburg. The two men discussed the ambassador's commission and then proceeded to Wittenburg to commence negotiations with Gustavus.<sup>171</sup>

They arrived on 5 November 1631 and two days later Vane had a private audience with the king. Gustavus immediately took the initiative. He wanted Charles to 'really joyne with him in the warre' at this propitious time and proposed that if '4 or 5 tonnes of gold' was sent to raise men then the Palatinate would be restored.<sup>172</sup> In reply, Vane stated that he was to find out how the Palatinate could be restored by war and emphasised Charles's recent aid in the form of Hamilton's army.<sup>173</sup> After acknowledging Hamilton's contribution, Gustavus promised that if the tons of gold were sent over immediately and an army of 10–12,000 in the spring, he would not lay down his sword until the king of Bohemia was restored.<sup>174</sup> Quite simply, Gustavus was restating the terms for alliance that he had sent Hamilton at court the year before, but with the addition of the gold. Gustavus concluded that if Charles did not assist he would be forced to make peace with the Emperor.<sup>175</sup> At Vane's suggestion commissioners were appointed to discuss the propositions more fully, presumably to give him time to get directions from London. In his subsequent letter to court Vane begged Dorchester to send plain and clear indications of what Charles desired either by peace or war.<sup>176</sup>

The king of Sweden left Wittenberg on 9 November after appointing Gustavus Horn, his field marshal, to treat with Vane, and nominated Hamilton to act as umpire, as one who held the interests of both parties in equal measure.<sup>177</sup> The talks with Horn fared no better. Things came to a head less than a week later when Horn, after failing to secure an offer from Vane, demanded financial aid and an army of 25,000 to be maintained by Charles for four years.<sup>178</sup> Vane broke off the talks next day, ostensibly over diplomatic precedence, but clearly to gain time and await instructions from London.<sup>179</sup> Despite feeling that Horn was keeping him in Wittenberg to badger him into agreement, Vane believed that Gustavus should be assisted if a reasonable contract could be negotiated. Arms, not a treaty, he told Dorchester, would decide the fate of Germany.<sup>180</sup>

<sup>169</sup> TNA SP16/201/54; NRS GD 406/1/184 (Vane to Hamilton, 7 October [1631]).

<sup>170</sup> NRS GD 406/1/154/1 (Charles I to Hamilton, 21 September 1631), GD 406/1/184; TNA SP 81/39 fol.143r (Hamilton to Vane, 8 October [? 1630]); NRS GD 406/1/9616 ([Draft] Hamilton to Vane, [16 October] 1631).

<sup>171</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9616, 9359; TNA SP 81/37 fol.116r (Astley to Dorchester, 11 November 1631); NRS GD 406/1/9616; TNA SP 81/37 fos.88r, 116r.

<sup>172</sup> TNA SP 81/37 fol.116r (Vane to Dorchester, 12 November 1631).

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.119r–120r. Vane was following his instructions to the letter.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.119v–120v. Gustavus appears to have equated 3 to 4 tons of gold with £300,000 to £400,000. During the same interview he also mentioned a figure of £200,000. Reeve, *Road to Personal Rule*, p.278, suggests that Gustavus demanded £200,000 which included 10,000 men to be sent in the spring. However, it seems rather that Gustavus wanted the tons of gold or cash (anything between £200,000–£400,000) and 10–12,000 men in the spring, TNA SP 81/37 fos.119v–120v.

<sup>175</sup> TNA SP 81/37 fol.120v.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.122v, Vane advised providing a British army rather than putting tons of gold into Gustavus's hands.

<sup>177</sup> *HMC Hamilton*, 74 (39) (Gustavus to Hamilton, 9 November 1631). For Gustavus leaving Wittenburg on the 9th, TNA SP 81/37 fol.139r.

<sup>178</sup> TNA SP 81/37 fol.164r (Vane to [Dorchester], 20 November 1631). The complete letter is fol.138r–142r with a section in cipher, which is deciphered at 164r–165v. The meeting was held on the afternoon of the 15th at Horn's lodgings. Hamilton was present, *Ibid.*, fol.139r.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.164v, Vane sent Hamilton to Horn to break off the negotiations because they could not agree where to meet.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.164v–165v.

Charles found Gustavus's demands 'impracticable' and had taken Hamilton's casualties 'like a father of his people' and therefore:

Is not resolved, whether he shall hereafter continue this maner of assistance, and therefore thinks fitt you should forbear any farther mencon of armyes to be sent and payd from hence but to leave that poynt as all other [of] the treaty without ingagem[en]t and free for his Matys choyse and direction hereafter.<sup>181</sup>

As usual, Charles retained the right to make the final decision and again Hamilton's experiences (and opinion) appear to have had an effect. Even so, the negotiations dragged on into the following spring. A final offer appears to have been that Charles would pay 40,000 thalers a month (£8,333 sterling) providing every effort was made to restore the Palatinate and electoral title to Frederick.<sup>182</sup> Gustavus finally accepted the money in March, but the projected Anglo-Swedish alliance was thwarted by the triple combination of Hamilton's disillusionment with Gustavus, Dorchester's death on 15 February 1632 and Weston's subsequent re-ascendency.<sup>183</sup>

Hamilton's own negotiations with the king of Sweden stumbled on over the same period and into the summer. Rather than breaking down like Vane's, they simply petered out as Hamilton realised that Gustavus had no further use for him. Hamilton's requests for payment for his troops and his future employment were the two issues under debate. Pay was a running sore that was never resolved. According to Vane, Hamilton would entertain the army until November 1631, and thereafter Gustavus would provide support.<sup>184</sup> Yet Vane had been instructed to emphasise – and exaggerate – the amount spent on Hamilton's expedition to illustrate that Charles was already committed to the cause. A figure of £100,000 sterling was recommended in his instructions, which Chancellor Oxenstierna threw at Hamilton during pay talks.<sup>185</sup> Hamilton could not deny this exaggerated figure and the Swedes refused to believe that he did not have sufficient funds.<sup>186</sup> In October, Hamilton complained bitterly to Charles that he had 'not resevitt wone penni' from the king of Sweden.<sup>187</sup> A month later, however, he received 6,000 rix dollars for four months service and was promised more.<sup>188</sup> Be that as it may, Gustavus never paid his mercenaries a regular wage. After advancing one months pay, as Vane observed, Gustavus relied on 'pillage and good words'.<sup>189</sup> Like the talks over pay, the prospect of a new army was linked to Charles's policy, despite Hamilton being assured by Gustavus that he was 'one of his owne'.<sup>190</sup> Nevertheless, as Vane's negotiations faltered, Hamilton's attempt to secure a decision on a levy for a new army was shunned.<sup>191</sup> When the treaty discussions broke down for the last time in the early summer, Hamilton told Charles

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, fol.234v.

<sup>182</sup> *HMC Hamilton*, 74 (40) (Conditions of Confederation ...); *HMC Hamilton*, 81 (60). Roe later stated that Astley, whom Hamilton had sent to court, carried back an offer of £10,000 a month 'without obligation', *CSPD*, 1631–33, 338 (Roe to Elizabeth, 28 May 1632).

<sup>183</sup> *CSPV* 1629–32, 608 (Gussoni to Doge, 16 April 1632).

<sup>184</sup> TNA SP 81/37 fol.122v (Vane to Dorchester, 12 November 1631).

<sup>185</sup> TNA SP 75/12 fol.206v; NRS GD 406/1/9365 (Hamilton to Charles I, [late February-April 1632]) noted in *HMC Hamilton*, 79–80 (57).

<sup>186</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9365 (Hamilton to Charles I, [late February-April 1632]) describes in veiled terms the position that Hamilton had been put in. For the King's eccentric reply, GD 406/1/158 (Charles I to Hamilton, 30 April 1632). A figure of £100,000 may have been spent in total on the expedition.

<sup>187</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9360 ([Draft] Hamilton to Charles I, [late 1631]) noted in *HMC Hamilton*, 78 (53).

<sup>188</sup> TNA SP 81/37 fol.117v (Astley to Dorchester, 11 November 1631); *Ibid.*, fol.176v (Vane to Dorchester, 3 December 1631).

<sup>189</sup> TNA SP 81/37 fol.176v; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, ii, 217–18.

<sup>190</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9364 (Hamilton to Charles I, 19 February [1631/2]).

<sup>191</sup> Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, ii, 614–615. The remnants of Hamilton's old army was reduced to two regiments and joined to the Duke William of Weimar's army, *Swedish Intelligencer*, p.30–31.

that he was 'not verie ambitious of farder employment heir.'<sup>192</sup> Gustavus admitted that the failure of the treaty had affected Hamilton's position and in the same interview proceeded to rage against Vane's and Charles I's coldness to Frederick of Bohemia's cause.<sup>193</sup>

As the picture became more bleak in Germany, the formidable double act of Charles and Will Murray began to plan Hamilton's return to court.<sup>194</sup> Given the protagonists, a certain amount of duplicity was involved. The idea was to make an offer for Hamilton's continued employment which would be refused, allowing him to bow out with honour. The scheme entailed Hamilton entering the Palatinate to assist France with as many men as Charles's proposed contribution could maintain.<sup>195</sup> As Charles expected, this came to nothing, but Hamilton's release was not secured. Finally, at the beginning of September, he was allowed to return home, ostensibly to raise fresh levies for the war.<sup>196</sup> In contrast to his outward journey the marquis returned to England accompanied by only two of his colonels, Sir James Ramsay and Sir James Hamilton of Priestfield, and by Sir John Hepburne who had replaced Sir Alexander Leslie as Swedish military adviser a year earlier.<sup>197</sup>

Protracted absence threatened a courtier's place, and Hamilton was no exception to the rule.<sup>198</sup> The attempt to implicate him in the alleged plot of 1631 was launched shortly after he left court for Scotland, but Ochiltree's imprisonment in Scotland provided an obvious deterrent to those who entertained similar designs. Even so, various rumours circulated. Some reported Hamilton's partiality to the Scots and one rumour, spread by a deserter, Christopher Crowe, claimed that all but one hundred of the army had starved to death.<sup>199</sup> For these reasons, Hamilton had to watch his back. A steady stream of letters passed between him and his friends, who included Will Murray, the earls of Roxburgh and Carlisle, lord Goring, Secretary Dorchester and Lord Treasurer Weston.<sup>200</sup> The first four were close associates keen to protect Hamilton's reputation.<sup>201</sup> As Charles's chief minister it was natural, if not politic, for Hamilton to keep Weston informed of his activities and to solicit his aid.<sup>202</sup> For Weston's part, both in his correspondence and actions, he responded cordially

<sup>192</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9367 (Hamilton to Charles I, May [1632]) noted in *HMC Hamilton*, 80–81 (59). Hamilton composed an earlier and more optimistic memorandum, 'My Desyres', about the spring of 1632, *NRA(S)* 2177, Bundle 1411, a transcription can be found in *NRA(S)* 2177, p. 267.

<sup>193</sup> *HMC Hamilton*, 80–81 (58) (Memorandum by Hamilton, [August/September, 1632]. For more on the king of Sweden's disappointment at the breakdown of the treaty, his attitude towards Hamilton, and his sense of humour, *HMC Hamilton Supplement*, 21–25.

<sup>194</sup> NRS GD 406/1/9306 (Will. Murray to Hamilton, 2 August 1632) noted in *HMC Hamilton Supplementary*, 25–26; GD 406/1/160 (Charles I to Hamilton, 1 August 1632).

<sup>195</sup> NRS GD 406/1/161.

<sup>196</sup> *NRA(S)* 2177, Bundle 1410,(2–2a) (Gustavus to Charles I, 7 September 1632); *Ibid.*, (7) (Letter of authorisation to Hamilton, 8 September 1632); *HMC Hamilton*, 81 (61) (Commission Gustavus to Hamilton, 8 September 1632) to levy 10–12,000 men.

<sup>197</sup> Monro, *Expedition*, ii, 154. Hamilton was 'honourably conveyed' from the king of Sweden's camp by all the Scots officers in the army, *Ibid.*

<sup>198</sup> *HMC, Denbigh*, v, 8 (Edward Nicholas to Lord Feilding, 13 December 1631). This view is expressed by Nicholas.

<sup>199</sup> The rumours were that Hamilton favoured the Scots over the English largely as a result of Colonel Sandy Hamilton's power over him, NRS GD 406/1/201 (Will. Murray to Hamilton, [late 1631]); for Crowe, see TNA SP 16/204/55 (Statement of Sir Richard Grosvenor, 14 December 1631); SP 16/214/22 (Petition of Crowe, [9 March] 1631/2).

<sup>200</sup> Will Murray, NRS GD 406/1/266, 268; Roxburgh, NRS GD 406/1/9268; Carlisle, NRS GD 406/1/195, 198, 196, 199; Goring, NRS GD 406/1/9269, 271; Dorchester, NRS GD 406/1/209, 230; Weston, NRS GD 406/1/231, 232, 267, 242. Other correspondents included the earl of Holland, NRS GD 406/1/9292, Sir James Galloway, NRS GD 406/1/270 and Henry Gyll, NRS GD 406/1/243.

<sup>201</sup> For example, NRS GD 406/1/195 (Carlisle to Hamilton, 7 August 1631). Hamilton addressed his packets to Carlisle, NRS GD 406/1/198; NRS GD 406/1/198 (Carlisle to Hamilton, 16 December 1631); NRS GD 406/1/9268 (Roxburgh to Hamilton, 1 July 1631); NRS GD 406/1/266 (Murray to Hamilton, 19 March 1631/2); NRS GD 406/1/271 (Goring to Hamilton, 1 May 1632). A lot of their letters appear to have miscarried, as Hamilton openly charged them with neglect, whereas they claimed to have written on numerous occasions, see for example, NRS GD 406/1/196, 266, 271.

<sup>202</sup> Hamilton wrote to Weston for that purpose, NRS GD 406/1/231 (Weston to Hamilton, 26 September, 1631), NRS GD 406/1/232 (16 December 1631), NRS GD 406/1/267 (27 March 1632), NRS GD 406/1/242 (2 May, 1632).

to Hamilton's letters and worked to heal the rift caused by the plot allegations of 1631.<sup>203</sup> Hamilton sent Sir Jacob Astley to England in March 1632, mainly to receive further directions from the king, and to dispel the rumours at court.<sup>204</sup> It seemed to work, for within a few days of his arrival Hamilton's friends happily reported 'all mouthes stopped' that were open to his disadvantage.<sup>205</sup>

Of course, Hamilton's greatest friend at court was the king, as all of his correspondents reminded him.<sup>206</sup> Charles was Hamilton's chief correspondent and confidant. In the Hamilton Papers alone, seventeen letters between them have survived: nine from Hamilton and eight from Charles, and in these there are references to six more, five from Hamilton and one from Charles, giving a total of twenty-three.<sup>207</sup> Of the eight surviving letters from the king, seven are written in his own hand and addressed to 'James' a personal address that Charles had only used with Buckingham.<sup>208</sup> The intimacy upon which Hamilton built his career, and which had deepened since Buckingham's death, is evident. Charles's last letter, dated 24 September 1632, illustrates the point:

James/ I wrote to you in my laste, to fynde a pretexte to cume home, but now I must tell you that it is not fitt for you to stay anie longer where ye ar, for, the impossabilitie of your imploiment there, & the necessitie of your business heere requyres your returne; so at this tyme I'l say no more, but, Nill mihi rescribas, at tamen [yse] veni: for ye shall be no sooner cum, then [be] wellcum to, your faithfull frend & cousin.<sup>209</sup>

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid*; Will. Murray assured Hamilton that he was 'beholden' to Weston, GD 406/1/268 (Murray to Hamilton, 29 March 1632).

<sup>204</sup> TNA SP 81/39 fos.183r-184r (Astley's Memorandum, [March 1632]).

<sup>205</sup> NRS GD 406/1/268 (Murray to Hamilton, 29 March 1632). See also, GD 406/1/199 (Carlisle to Hamilton, 27 March 1631/2). For Charles's favourable report of Astley's efforts on Hamilton's behalf, GD 406/1/158 (Charles I to Hamilton, 30 April 1632). Astley was feted by Hamilton's friends at court, Carlisle especially, TNA SP 16/214/64 (25 March 1631/2).

<sup>206</sup> For Example, NRS GD 406/1/195, 266, 268.

<sup>207</sup> For Hamilton, NRS [Hamilton Catalogue] GD 406/1/9355, 9359, 9360, 9356, 9361, 9363, 9365, 9367. For Charles, [Hamilton Catalogue] GD 406/1/153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161. The king acknowledged receipt of the other five letters in GD 406/1/153, 155, 160. Hamilton acknowledged receiving one from Charles dated 3 December 1631, GD 406/1/9363.

<sup>208</sup> The exception is NRS GD 406/1/160.

<sup>209</sup> NRS GD 406/1/161. The Latin translates, 'Write me nothing but just come'.